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The Impact of Defence Expenditures on 
Arab Industrial Development 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of military expenditures 
in affecting the pattern of Arab industrial development. In doing so, it 
attempts to determine whether military expenditures have stimulated 
increased levels of industrial output, or whether, through diverting 
resources away from industrial activity, they have depressed the expansion 
of the region's industrial diversification. 
By the use of factor and regression analysis, the main finding of the 
study is that defence expenditures in the Arab world have been somewhat 
neutral in impacting on industrial output. In contrast, the study found 
that non-defence expenditures have tended to retard the region's 
industrial diversification efforts. 
These findings suggest that analysis of the relative skill intensities of 
civilian and defence expenditures might be a fruitful area for further 
research into the process of Arab industrialization. 
INTRODUCTION 
In just over a decade the Arab world in general and the Gulf states in 
particular have experienced an unprecedented growth in economic 
output and industrial production. The new regional era began with 
military and political events-the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Arab oil 
embargo - but resulted in an economic growth that few Third World 
regions can hope to experience. 1 
The benefits of rapid increases in oil revenues were confined not only 
to the oil-exporting states, but were distributed to neighbouring countries 
through financial assistance, expanded trade, and jobs for skilled and 
unskilled workers. 
Concurrent with rapid economic growth in the Arab world was an 
acceleration in regional military spending. Military purchases were 
partially financed by oil revenues and by military aid and grants from the 
major arms suppliers. 2 For the Middle East region as a whole real military 
expenditures increased from $60.5 billion in 1975 to $71.2 billion in 1985.3 
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During this period, military expenditures averaged around 30 per cent 
of central government expenditures. This compares with an average of 
around 20 per cent for developing countries as a whole. Military 
expenditure per capita averaged around $500, while the average for 
developing countries as a whole was around $50. While the armed forces 
per 1,000 people averaged around 15 in the Middle East, in the 
developing countries as a whole the figure was only 5 per 1,000 people.4 
Ironically, as Lebovic and Ishaq5 point out, this increase in military 
expenditures coincided with rates of rapid growth: 
During the 1973-82 period the average annual economic growth 
rate for individual Middle Eastern states was about 6.0 per cent 
while military expenditure grew by approximately 13.0 per cent per 
year. Although military expenditure levels vary greatly across 
countries, in a great majority of the countries, the growth rate of 
military spending out-paced economic growth. This indicates a 
striking trend in the region toward higher military burdens. 6 
To date most of the analysis concerning Middle Eastern military 
expenditures has focused on strategic issues and the resulting shifts in 
regional military balance stemming from the recent explosion in defence 
expenditures. Those studies examining the economic effects from 
defence expenditures have focused largely on the identification of 
linkages between defence expenditures and economic growth. While 
these studies have provided some insight as to the shorter-term economic 
costs (and occasional benefits) provided by defence expenditures, Ionger-
term factors such as effects on industrial growth and diversification may 
ultimately determine whether the Middle East military build-up has 
seriously retarded (or possibly aided) the eventual attainment of viable, 
self-sustained economic growth of the majority of the region's countries. 
The general purpose of the analysis below is to shed more light on the 
role of military expenditures in affecting economic development in the 
Arab world. In particular, we are interested in determining the impact, if 
any, of military expenditures on the industrial development of the region. 
Have military expenditures stimulated increased levels of industrial 
output or, perhaps by diverting resources away from industrial activity, 
have defence expenditures tended to depress the expansion of the 
region's industrial diversification and development? 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Historically, most analysis of the economic impacts of defence expendi-
tures on Third World development have cortcentrated on possible growth 
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effects (either positive or negative) stemming from increased defence 
burdens. While not dealing with the issue of industrialization directly, 
these studies do throw light on the types of impact on manufacturing one 
might expect from increased military burdens. 
The classic study of the economic effects of military spending was done 
in the early 1970s by Emile Benoit for the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. His findings are summarized as follows: 
There were indications of some favourable growth effects of 
defence expenditures on a gross basis. Defence manpower training 
created and strengthened attitudes and skills useful in civilian 
occupations, and the defence programmes provided dual use 
infrastructure and other goods and services similar to those 
provided by the civilian economy. An observed association between 
high defence burdens, high rates of price increases, and high growth 
rates . . . also suggested the likelihood that in some countries 
defence expenditures may have had a 'Keynesian' type of effect in 
stimulating the use of unemployed or underemployed resources by 
raising aggregate demand where anti-inflation policies would 
otherwise have kept it below the level conducive to maximum real 
growth. Up to a certain level, defence programmes also contributed 
to the essential security required for economic progress, and under 
conditions of national danger may even have had energizing and 
motivational benefits. 
He went on to note that: 8 
Devoting resources to high-grade, civilian investment projects 
rather than to defence might; of course, have produced even more 
growth. However, even here the practically relevant consideration 
is not the optimum alternative use of the resources but the probable 
actual alternative use. The probable actual alternative use of the 
resources absorbed by defence programmes is civilian consumption 
with slight growth effects, civilian investment projects with widely 
varying growth effects, and no use at all - that is a higher rate of 
unemployment of resources. 
Much of the criticism of Benoit is ideological in content. But some 
valid criticisms of his assumptions, data and methodology can and have 
been made. 9 Since Benoit's original work, research on the impact of Third 
World military expenditures has taken four broad directions: 
1. More sophisticated extensions of Benoit direct-impact effects. 
2. Estimates focusing on direct and indirect effects. 
3. Differential impacts of defence l!xpenditures in sub-groupings of 
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countries based on relative resource endowments. 
4. Eclectic studies focusing on defence/security impacts. 
The first set of studies have concentrated on larger sample sizes, and/or 
improved methodologies: 10 
1. Using a slightly different methodology, Lim11 repeated Benoit's 
analysis on a larger group of developing countries (54) for a later 
time period (1965-73) and found high military burdens to be 
detrimental to economic groeth. 
" 2. Faini and associates12 employed regression estimates for 69 
countries over some or all of the period 1952-70 and found that an 
increase of 10 percentage points in the defence burden leads to a 
reduction of annual growth by 0.13%. 
While Benoit, Lim, and Faini concentrated on the direct impacts of 
defence expenditures, a second set of studies largely undertaken by 
Deger13 and his associates have focused on their indirect ramifications. 
Using equation systems that posit, in addition to the direct spin-off 
effects, related effects through reduced private investment or domestic 
savings, Deger and Sen1• and Deger and Smith15 show that for the 1965-73 
period ( 50 countries) that, although military spending has a small positive 
effect on growth, the net effect of military spending on growth is negative 
owing to associated decreases in investment and/or savings. 
It is not altogether apparent in any of these studies whether the 
military burden acts in some way as the statistical proxy for government 
expenditures. As noted, the size of the government is recognized to have 
a positive direct effect (Keynesian) and a negative indirect effect 
(crowding-out of private investment) on economic growth. 
The third direction taken by post-Benoit researchers has involved the 
disaggregating of developing countries into categories, such as resource 
rich and resource poor or foreign-exchange constrained and uncon-
strained. 16 In general these studies have found that resource-rich or 
foreign-exchange abundant countries tend to derive positive impacts on 
growth from increased military burdens, presumably because they have 
sufficient resources to pay for both defence and development. 
On the other hand, resource-constrained, foreign-exchange poor 
nations tend to have much lower military expenditures relative to gross 
domestic product. For these countries, military expenditures tend to have 
a negative impact on growth. Although during periods of austerity high 
opportunity costs might indicate that defence cuts could be appropriate, 
for this group of countries it is usually development projects that are 
reduced. The reasons are very simple: military expenditures are current 
outlays (not including arms bought on credit), whereas development 
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projects are future growths, and there is a natural tendency to try to 
maintain the status quo. As a result, military budgets in resource-
constrained countries are often not significantly reduced during periods 
of austerity. 11 
Finally, the last group of studies tend to focus more on the total impact 
of defence/security/human capital on economic development. As Charles 
Wolfnotes: 18 
... paramilitary forces can contribute to economic development by 
their contributions to internal and external stability. Moreover, the 
real economic costs imposed by the military on developing countries 
can be reduced to the extent these forces provide training, 
construction, technological and industrial spill-overs that 
contribute to economic growth. Evidence in support of both of 
these propositions is provided by the experience of several of the 
successfully modernizing countries during the past decade. 
In a more recent study, Weede finds considerable empirical support 
for the proposition that increased military participation rates increase 
economic growth: 19 
In my view, the positive effect of military service on economic 
performance should be explained as follows: the military teaches 
discipline and creates a useful habit of obeying orders. Where the 
military participation ratios are high, the military is more likely to 
be disciplined and effective than elsewhere, since there is a 
perceived need to be on the alert against foreign enemies. 
Moreover, the higher the military participation ratio, the more 
young men acquire discipline and obedience. That is why I regard 
the military participation ratio as a discipline-related indicator of 
human capital formation, why I suggest to broaden the notion of 
human capital formation so as to include abilities and discipline. 
Clearly, the Arab world, given its relatively low levels of human capital 
formation, should be one of the areas most receptive to this link between 
military expenditure, military participation, human capital formation and 
economic growth. 
However, in their study of the relationship between defence burdens 
and growth in the Middle East, Lebovic and Ishaq20 found, in general, 
that the relationship was negative for the non-oil exporting countries, but 
that no statistically significant pattern existed for the sample (17 
countries) as a whole. The negative finding is of course consistent with 
those obtained by Frederiksen and Looney, who make a distinction 
between resource-constrained and resmuce-abundant countries. 
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Given the small sample size of oil producers in the Middle East, 
Lebovic and Ishaq were not able to test for any potential positive 
relationship between defence expenditures and economic growth, a 
relationship identified by Frederiksen and Looney for larger samples of 
developing countries. These positive relationships have, however, been 
identified through time-series analysis for certain individual countries and 
periods of time. 
In his exmaination of the Saudi Arabian economy, Looney21 found 
that: 22 
1. In general, military expenditures have had a net positive impact 
on the country's overall gross capital formation. That is, after 
allowing for government expenditures and oil revenues, increases in 
military expenditures have had a net stimulating effect on 
investment in the Kingdom. The same also applies to non-oil 
investment. Here, however, the size of the coefficient (0.30) of 
defence expenditures is low compared with that of government 
investment (0.79). 
2. Military expenditures do not appear to stimulate either total 
private-sector expenditures or consumption. Again government 
investment appears particularly productive in contributing to 
increased levels of private-sector consumption. 
3. Military expenditures do not appear to increase levels of imports 
nearly as much as do the levels of government expenditures or oil 
revenues. 
4. Interestingly enough, military expenditures appear to induce 
private-sector investment, whereas government investment seems 
to crowd out or pre-empt resources that might otherwise flow 
towards this sector. 
5. In the net result, military expenditures appear to contribute 
more to total demand than does government consumption. The 
stimulating effect of military expenditures on other types of 
government expenditure (particularly in the light of the apparently 
negative effect of government consumption on investment) has 
tended to reinforce this effect. 
In short, military expenditures in the Saudi Arabian context appear to 
have (in addition to their security value) a number of significant impacts 
on the private sector, not all of which are negative. In particular, several 
of the major areas of private-sector activity appear to derive more of a 
stimulus from government expenditures than from other forms of 
government allocations. The same also appears to apply to the level of 
gross capital formation and non-oil investment. 
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In addition, Looney's results suggest that a careful shifting of 
government allocations from public-sector consumption to capital 
formation (providing that profitable areas for investment have not been 
exhausted), rather than across-the-board reductions in military 
expenditures, is the most productive policy open to the authorities for 
contributing to private-sector expansion. 
In a slightly different context, it has been suggested that excessive 
defence expenditures led to the economic instability preceding the 
Iranian Revolution. While this argument sounds quite plausible, recent 
cross-section research has reached the counter intuitive conclusion that 
Iran may have actually derived a number of beneficial economic impacts 
from allocations to the military. However, cross-sectional analysis looks 
at only one point in time, and hence its results are always sensitive to the 
dates chosen for examination. 
To determine if time-series analysis provides a different perspective on 
the impact of the country's military expenditures, another time-series 
study by Looney23 attempted to quantify the impacts of military 
expenditures on the Iranian economy over the 1959-77 period, and, in 
particular, the consequences associated with the rapid military build-up 
undertaken by the Shah in the mid-1970s. 
In general, Looney's findings indicated that, while a case could be 
made that the Iranian economy received positive net benefits from 
defence expenditures in the 1960s, this relationship broke down in the 
1970s, with added military expenditures, perhaps through the bottlenecks 
they created, having a negative impact on a number of sectors and types 
of capital formation. Interestingly enough, these negative effects were 
not systematically associated with other types of government 
expenditures, indicating that defence expenditures were unique in their 
marginal, negative impact on private-sector output after the 1973-74 
revenue boom. 
Again these findings are consistent with cross-section analysis, which 
indicates that resource-constrained countries generally experience 
negative impacts from military expenditures, while those not constrained 
by foreign exchange and/or domestic savings are capable of experiencing 
positive impacts from increased allocations to defence. 
IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
INDUSTRIAL DIVERSIFICATION 
While the studies described above provide a number of insights as to the 
ways in which military expenditures affect economic performance in the 
Arab world, they are somewhat silent tis to the manner in which these 
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effects occur. In particular, it is not always apparent whether in these 
studies the military burden simply acts in some way as the statistical proxy 
for government expenditures. As noted, the size of these is likely to have 
a positive direct effect (Keynesian) and a negative indirect effect 
(crowding-out) on private-sector activity. Are the net impacts of these 
effects similar or opposite for defence and non-defence governmental 
expenditures? 
In terms of their impact, defence expenditures in particular and/or 
government expenditures in general may retard industrial development 
because of their potential to cause:24 (a) a decrease in private 
consumption because fewer resources (including foreign-exchange) are 
available to the civilian sector; (b) a decrease in civilian imports, and even 
balance of payments difficulties owing to increased military imports; (c) 
an increase in inflation owing to increased government budget deficits; 
(d) a distortion of the pricing system because generally military 
procurements are not made in open, competitive markets; (e) shortages 
of managerial skills and skilled workers in a labour-constrained civilian 
sector leading to reduced productivity and growth; (f) a distribution of 
income in favour of the military and against the civilian sector; and (g) an 
increase in the political power of the military leading it to control, and 
pre-empt if necessary, the civilian sector of the economy. 
Many of these effects combine in the oil-exporting countries to 
produce the so-called 'Dutch disease' effect whereby a booming oil sector 
impacts in such a way as to create an expanding non-traded goods (and 
services) sector, and a declining or stagnating non-oil (externally) traded 
goods sector. 
In the developed countries (in , particular Holland) where this 
phenomenon was first observed, it has been associated with 'de-
industrialization', while in the less-developed countries and especially 
among OPEC members it has been associated with a fall in domestic 
production of traded agricultural and industrial goods (except of course 
where the product enjoys high tariff barriers and/or import restrictions) 
and a boost to construction and services (both of which are mostly non-
traded in terms of the final product). 
The Dutch disease model is based upon a three-factor, two-commodity 
full employment model of production and trade. 25 Specifically the 
economy is assumed to produce two commodities: one traded 
internationally (either exported or imported or both), the other traded 
only domestically, since either transported costs or import restrictions 
prevent the commodity from being internationally traded. The two 
sectors producing traded and non-traded goods are assumed to have 
capital in a fixed amount that is given and nhn-shiftable in the short run. 
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The labour force is fixed in the aggregate, but mobile between the two 
sectors. 
To sum up, the model assumes two specific factors, one mobile factor 
and two commodities, one internationally traded and the other not. 
Based on these assumptions, significantly increased oil-financed, public-
sector expenditures produce a change in relative sectoral prices. The 
resultant price/wage movements determine factor incomes and sectoral 
output. 26 
Based on the above assumptions, petroleum-financed expenditures 
impact in a predictable manner: imports expand and there is a decline in 
the relative price of traded goods. This is a direct result of the fact that the 
initial excess in demand increases the price of non-traded goods (which 
are realistically assumed to be in limited supply in the short run). Higher 
disposable income, the relative price advantage of traded goods after the 
boom, plus lower production of traded goods at home (owing to their 
lower relative price and resulting fall in profitability), increase the 
demand for imports, thus causing the trade balance to deteriorate. 
However, the country's ability to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
supported by dollar-dominated oil revenues, together with rising prices 
for non-tradeables result in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
Given the fixed capital stock and perfectly competitive markets, the 
demand for labour in each sector depends on the wage/price relationship 
in that sector. The demand for labour depends negatively on the sectoral 
real product wage (ratio of the wage to sectoral output price). This means 
that a rise in the relative price of one sector by more than the wage would 
increase employment and thereby output in that sector. 
Increased output would involve higher cost per unit, since it would 
come about through an increase in the sector's use of labour per unit of 
capital, implying a falling sectoral marginal physical product of labour, 
because the capital stock is fixed. The mobility of labour and the 
immobility of capital means that a change in the relative price of traded to 
non-traded goods would have an uneven impact on factor incomes. 
Labour mobility allows labour to shift out of the traded sector, and 
thereby maintain or raise its real income, while capital immobility means 
that the returns to capital fall sharply in the sector with a lower relative 
price, and returns to capital rise sharply in the sector with a higher relative 
price. 
It is clear that the traditional Dutch disease-oriented approach to the 
analysis of oil booms stresses the factors associated with the appreciation 
of the real exchange rate, driven by a rise in the relative price of non-
traded goods. The relative price shift causes a reallocation of labour 
towards the non-traded sector, a rise ifl the output of non-traded goods 
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and a fall in the output of traded goods. Returns to capital in non-traded 
activities rise, while returns in traded activities fall. 
On the surface, there is considerable evidence that most of the patterns 
predicted by the model outlined above have characterized development 
in two of the leading Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. For example, 
in a recent study Al-Sabah found that: 21 
1. The real share of the tradeable sector in non-oil GDP increased 
from 9.97 per cent in 1966 to more than 14.5 per cent in 1974, but 
then declined to only 12.4 per cent in 1978. In contrast the private 
non-tradeable sector behaved in the opposite manner: its share 
continued to decline in the 1960s and early 1970s (it reached 44. 7 per 
cent of non-oil GDP in 1974), but after 1974 it recovered strongly to 
contribute more than half of the non-oil real GDP in 1978. The 
public non-tradeable sector, on the other hand, behaved in a 
fluctuating manner, with a downward trend. 
2. Not only did the real growth rate of the private non-tradeable 
sector surpass those of the tradeable and the public non-tradeable 
sector, but it also emerged in the 1978-80 period as the fastest 
employer. Employment in the private non-tradeable sector 
increased from 24.46 per cent of the total labour force in 1975 to 
more than 32 per cent in 1980. 
3. Even though the tradeable and the public non-tradeable sector 
managed to increase their absolute numbers of labour employment 
(owing to the large influx of foreign labour), they were not able to 
increase their relative shares in total employment. 
4. Government expenditure on wages and salaries, which 
represents more than 80 per cent of current expenditure, increased 
by about 130 per cent during the period 1972-78, although the 
increase in the size of government employment was no more than 48 
per cent in the same period, reflecting the fact that nominal wages in 
the government sector increased by more than 80 per cent during 
the six-year period. 
5. Government expenditures increased by more than 250 per cent 
during the 1973/74 to 1977/78 period. Given the scarcity of 
indigenous labour, the huge increase in government expenditure 
resulted in a large increase in the cost of labour, and also in intense 
real estate speculation, which made real estate transactions more 
profitable than building new housing. As a result, a severe housing 
shortage developed, which was reflected by the more than 80 per 
cent increase in the rental index of housing during 1975-78. 
6. In terms of relative rates of inflarion, the price index for the 
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tradeable goods sector relative to the GDP deflator was continually 
decreasing throughout the 1974-78 period. In other words, price 
inflation in the tradeable sector was decreasing relative to general, 
domestic price inflation, whereas price inflation in private non-
tradeable outpaced domestic inflation. Price responses of the public 
non-tradeable sector, on the other hand, were less regular - possibly 
because of their largely administered prices and the dominance of 
the government sector. 
7. The appreciation of the real exchange rate, (defined by Al-Sabah 
as the GDP deflator for tradeable goods relative to the GDP 
deflator for private non-tradeable goods), was a clear signal for 
private resources to be reallocated towards non-tradeable activities 
(like real estate speculation), while profitability in the tradeable 
sector tended to be squeezed between rising domestic costs and 
import competition. 
8. During this period the importance of trade to the Kuwaiti 
economy increased considerably. The trade balance was only about 
11.5 per cent of the GDP in 1970, but after the oil price increase of 
1973-74, it increased tremendously with a value of more than half 
the 1974 GDP. 
9. The movements of the nominal exchange rate, however, in the 
period 1974-78 appear to have had a weak linkage with particular 
components of the balance of payments. The Kuwaiti dinar's 
exchange rate was not very sensitive to changes in the current or 
capital account, perhaps because it was heavily influenced by the 
authorities' desire to curtail imported inflation. 
10. There is a remarkable association between the real exchange 
rate, share of tradeable goods in non-oil GDP, and non-oil trade 
deficits relative to GDP. Up to 1974, the real exchange rate was 
depreciating, with inflation in the tradeable sector far exceeding 
inflation in non-tradeables. The rise in the relative price of 
tradeable goods had presumably reduced the growth rate and 
demand for tradeables relative to non-tradeables. This factor may 
go a long way in explaining the 28 per cent reduction in the ratio of 
the non-oil trade deficit in GDP during the 1971-74 period. On the 
other hand, real depreciation, among other things had apparently 
stimulated growth in the tradeable sector and led to more than a ten 
per cent increase in the share of tradeables in non-oil real GDP. 
11. The picture for 1974-78 is very consistent with the Dutch 
disease model, in that in the case of the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate, one would expect the growth in domestic demand for 
tradeables to increase relative to non-tradeables, which leads to an 
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increase in the trade deficit and hence a squeeze in profitability of 
the tradeable sector relative to non-tradeables. In fact, real 
appreciation was associated with a substantial increase in the non-
oil trade deficit, and a noticeable reduction in the share of the 
tradeable sector in non-oil real GDP. Interestingly enough, the 
private non-tradeable sector, which was a major looser during the 
period of real depreciation, made a remarkable recovery after the 
price shock of 1973-74. 
In sum, Al-Sabah presents a convincing case for the existence of the 
Dutch disease in Kuwait, at least through the 1970s. These results were 
also confirmed for the expanded time period, 197~5, by Looney28 in a 
recent study which found that: 
1. Primary activities: agriculture, fishing, and mining exhibit mixed 
results from real exchange-rate appreciation, with agriculture and 
mining experiencing weak Dutch disease effects (the rather low 
level of statistical significance of the Dutch disease term) with 
fishing obtaining a positive stimulus from this effect. 
2. Manufacturing activities exhibit a fairly consistent pattern of 
Dutch disease effects. As expected, this sector largely comprised 
products that are tradeable and experienced generally negative 
impacts from both an appreciating exchange rate and an increase in 
relative prices. 
3. As expected, services consisting largely of non-tradeables 
generally experienced positive Dutch disease effects. 
Finally, in his study of Saudi Arabian industrialization Looney29 found 
that, in general, in the case of tradeables: 
1. Government expenditures and credit have played a major role in 
stimulating production. 
2. The problems associated with an appreciating exchange rate, the 
Dutch disease, have tended to reduce output. This applies to both 
long- and short-run movements in the case of agriculture, mining 
and refining, and shorter-run movements in the case of non-oil 
manufacturing. 
From this, Looney concluded that, in the case of Saudi Arabia, oil 
revenues have tended to work at somewhat cross purposes for the general 
class of tradeables. On the expenditure side, oil revenues have been 
converted into both effective demand and available credit that would 
obviously not have been present otherwise. On the other hand, the 
competitive effects associated with excha'nge rate appreciation have 
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apparently tended to offset any cost-reducing effects stemming from 
lower cost imports of capital, intermediate goods and labour. Here, 
however, non-oil manufacturing presents an interesting exception, in that 
the longer-run effects associated with the Dutch disease have tended to 
net out, leaving only shorter-run negative impacts stemming from 
appreciation in the real exchange rate. 
In the case of non-tradeables a much different pattern has developed\ 
1. With the exception of construction, direct government expendi-
tures have played a minor role in stimulating production. With the 
exception of wholesale and retail trade, the same applies to credit. 
2. On the other hand, again with the possible exception of 
wholesale and retail trade, in the short run all these sectors have 
received considerable stimulus through their higher domestic prices 
and reduced import costs associated with an appreciating exchange 
rate. 
Looney found that, in spite of apparent Dutch disease symptoms in 
Saudi Arabia, long-run disincentives did not appear to be preventing 
expansion in the manufacturing sector as a whole. In part this finding may 
result from the fact that the manufacturing sector in Saudi Arabia is 
extremely non-homogeneous, with a modern export sector superimposed 
on a local more traditional, non-traded set of activities, largely producing 
for ARAMCO and the construction sector (non-tradeables). There is 
likely to be imperfect substitution between many of the local 
manufactured goods and imported products. Given the fact that the 
manufacturing sector is comprised of both tradeables and non-
tradeables, any long-term trends in the exchange rate are likely to be 
neutral for the sector as a whole. 
On the other hand, Looney concluded that, given likely developments 
in the oil sector and the resulting inability to import massive amounts of 
labour and capital, the government, burdened with an overvalued real 
exchange rate, will find it increasingly difficult to attain its highest 
priority: diversification through expansion of the traded goods sector. 
THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF DEFENCE 
AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
In sum, while differing somewhat on specific details, empirical studies on 
the ramifications of increased government expenditures tend to 
pessimism: studies focusing on the impact of defence expenditures tend to 
stress the retarding effect of these allocations on general growth; studies 
stressing general or total governmental> expenditures, especially in oil-
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rich countries, tend to indicate that the side effects associated with these 
expenditures often depress industrial investment and development. 
Obviously, for policy purposes it is important to determine the manner 
in which government expenditures influence industrial development: 
1. Are these effects largely direct, i.e., the diversion of labour, 
capital and foreign exchange from the industrial sector, or are they 
of the indirect type associated with the Dutch disease? 
2. Are there additional consequences, such as accelerated growth 
stemming from government expenditures, strong enough to 
neutralize or even offset any possible disincentives to industrial 
investment and expansion associated with public sector 
expenditures? 
3. Are military expenditures more likely than non-military 
allocations to affect industrial development and diversification? 
To examine these issues an analysis was made of the patterns of 
government expenditures and manufacturing output in a sample of the 20 
Arab countries for which the Arab Monetary Fund publishes data on a 
continuing basis. 30 
In estimating the impact of government expenditures on industrial 
growth and diversification, it is assumed that the sectoral share of 
manufacturing output at some point in time [MANUF(t)] is a function 
of manufacturing output in a base year (MANUF(o)], the share of 
government expenditures in economic activity [GE(t)], the appreciation 
of the real foreign exchange rate [DUTCH), and real per capita economic 
'"' growth [DYP], with the expected signs: 
MANUF(t) = [GE(t), DUTCH, DYP, MANUF(o)J 
? + + + 
1. The expected sign of government expenditure can be either positive or 
negative, depending on the net effect of crowding out vs Keynesian 
demand linkages. Government expenditures were broken down into three 
main categories: (a) total government, (GE); (b) defence expenditures 
(MILX), and (c) non-defence expenditures (GEC). 
2. Since the Dutch disease variable is defined as the nominal exchange 
rate in terms of dollars (deflated by the ratio of import to domestic 
prices), higher values would therefore indicate depreciation of the 
currency, and its expected sign is therefore negative. For estimation 
purposes the term DUTCH represents the change in the real exchange 
rate from its 1974 base. 
3. The growth of domestic demand, DYP, is defined as the change in real 
per capita income from the base year of 1974. 
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4. Two terms were used to represent the extent of industrialization in 
some base year: MANNO, the share of manufacturing output to non-oil 
GDP and MANTDS, the ratio of manufacturing value added to that of 
distribution. These two terms were chosen because they show significant 
differences between oil and non-oil Arab countries. 
The received literature is of somewhat limited value in providing 
insights as to the appropriate operational definition of several of the key 
variables. For instance, is the relative degree of industrial development 
and/or diversification best represented by the share of manufacturing in 
GDP, or the share of manufacturing in total expenditures? The same 
applies to the relative extent of public sector expenditures. Is the relative 
burden of military expenditures best depicted as the share of 
governmental expenditures in GDP, its share relative to private sector 
expenditures, or its share of total expenditures? 
It is quite clear that any definition of either the relative degree of 
industrialization or governmental expenditures will be arbitrary. To 
avoid as much as possible the use of arbitrary definitions of key variables, 
a factor analysis was used to create indexes of both industrial activity and 
the government's rdative control of resources. Since total government 
expenditures and non-defence public-sector expenditures were highly 
correlated, a separate factor analysis was performed for each. Other 
variables included in each factor analysis were those representing defence 
expenditures, manufacturing and oil. 
A typical factor analysis, together with individual country scores on 
each factor, is given in Table 1. 
1. The factor depicting total government expenditures was comprised 
largely of government expenditures as a percentage of non-oil GDP, 
GDP and domestic absorption. The same applied to non-defence public-
sector expenditures. 
2. The factor depicting the relative degree of industrialization consisted 
largely of manufacturing as a share of non-oil GDP, and manufacturing as 
a share of domestic absorption. 
3. The oil variable was composed largely of variables representing the 
ratio of oil to non-oil GDP and domestic absorption. 
4. Military expenditures were represented by a factor depicting the 
influence of military expenditures as a share in total government 
expenditures, and military expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP and 
total Gross National Product. 
The interesting aspect of the factor analysis was the finding of little 
correlation between total government expenditures and those allocated 
to defence. The same result was also obtained in a factor analysis 
.. , 
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containing both non-defence and defence expenditures. In addition, and 
somewhat contrary to popular belief, it appears that military expendi-
tures in the Arab world are determined by factors other than general 
budgetary considerations and/or the ability to finance expenditures out of 
sources such as oil revenues. 
TABLE 1 
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ARAB WORLD ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, 1983 
(standard regression coefficients) 
Variable Factor 1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Gov Exp Oil Military Manuf 
gov exp/GDP 1.10* --0.33 0.02 0.04 
gov exp/absorption 0.83* 0.33 --0.07 0.05 
gov exp/non-oil GDP 0.80* 0.34 --0.07 --0.07 
oil/absorption --0.08 1.02* 0.04 0.06 
oil/non-oil GDP --0.01 0.99* 0.02 --0.03 
military exp/gov exp --0.21 --0.04 1.09* 0.04 
military exp/absorption 0.31 0.11 0.74* --0.01 
military exp/non-oil GDP 0.34 0.15 0.66* --0.08 
manufacturing/non-oil GDP 0.12 0.03 0.00 1.01* 
manufacturing/absorption --0.09 0.00 0.00 0.96* 
Factor Scores Factor 1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Oil Producers 
UAE -1.36 1.12 0.63 1.35 
Bahrain --0.62 --0.14 --0.97 0.99 
Arabia 1.26 1.43 1.12 --0.30 
Oman 0.82 1.62 2.43 -1.49 
Kuwait 0.96 1.44 --0.89 --0.13 
Libya 0.46 1.17 0.82 -1.14 
Other 
Jordan --0.16 --0.88 0.37 0.25 
PDRYemen 1.25 -1.00 --0.10 0.01 
Yemen Arab Rep. --0.31 --0.92 0.53 --0.87 
Egypt 0.70 --0.32 0.68 1.08 
Algeria 0.32 0.16 -1.16 0.53 
Tunisia --0.44 --0.50 --0.92 0.54 
Sudan -1.24 --0.86 --0.97 --0.71 
Somalia --0.60 --0.87 --0.22 -1.04 
Morocco --0.90 --0.73 --0. 73 1.86 
Mauritania -1.03 --0.72 --0.63 --0.93 
Notes: Factor analysis based on orthagonal rotation. Manufacturing and oil data from: Arab 
Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-1985. Government and military 
expenditure data from: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985. 
Finally; several country patterns stand out: 
1. The oil countries, with the exception of the UAE, have generally 
relatively high levels of governmental expenditures. With the exception 
of Bahrain and Kuwait, the same also applie's to military expenditures. 
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2. Again with the exception of the UAE and Bahrain, the oil countries are 
at a somewhat lower stage of industrial development and diversification. 
3. In general, there is little association between total government 
expenditures and defence expenditures in the Arab world. Notable 
exceptions are Bahrain, Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Morocco. 
The next step in the analysis was to test for the relative importance of 
government expenditures in affecting the pattern of industrial 
development and diversification. For this purpose estimates were made 
of the equation given above forthree points in time: 1985, 1983, and 1977. 
Here, 1985 was selected since it represented the last year for which 
complete data were available. 
Both 1983 and 1977 were selected because they represented the 
conditions after the effects of the first (1973174) and the second (1978179) 
oil price shock had worked themselves out. 
TABLE 2 
RELATIVE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
ARAB WORLD INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1985 
(standard regression coefficients) 
MANUF = - 0.41 GET + 0.51 DUTCH+ 0.45 DYP + 0.44 MANTDS77 - 0.21 MANN077 
(-3.01) (2.70) (1.75) (2.10) (-0.56) 
r2 = 0.890; F = 11.39 df = 12 
MANUF = - 0.44 GEC + 0.48 DUTCH + 0.42 DYP + 0. 77 MANTDS77 - 0.o7 MANN077 
(-2.88) (3.06) (2.82) (1. 97) (-0.19) 
r2 = 0.881; F = 10.33 df = 12 
MANUF = - 0.25 MILX + 0.55 DUTCH + 0.48 DYP + 0.55 MANTDS77 - 0.23 MANN077 
(-0. 98) (2.39) < (2.16) (1.06) (-0.37) 
r2 = 0.779; F = 4.95 df = 12 
MANUF = - 0.27 OIL + 0.53 DUTCH + 0.52 DYP + 0.37 MANTDS77 + 0.05 MANN077 
(-1.41) (2.56) (2.44) (0.79) (0.10) 
r2 = 0.804; F = 5.76 df = 12 
Notes: Manufacturing (MANUF); total government expenditures (GET); non-military 
government expenditures (GEC); military expenditures (MILX); and oil (OIL) are factor 
scores derived from a four-factor oblique rotation comprised of: oil, manufacturing, 
military and government expenditure variables. The manufacturing factor consists of 
manufacturing/non-oil GDP, and manufacturing/absorption. The oil variable consists of 
mineral sector output as a share of non-oil GDP and absorption. The military factor consists 
of: military expenditures/total government expenditures, military expenditures, non-oil 
GDP, and military expenditures/absorption. The government expenditure factors consist of 
government expenditure as a share of: absorption, non-oil GDP and GDP. DUTCH is the 
Dutch disease effect and represents the appreciation of the real exchange rate over the 
1974-85 period, i.e., a positive sign indicates depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
DYPNO = growth in non-oil per capita income over the 1974-85 period; MANN077 = the 
share of manufacturing output in non-oil GDP, 1977; and MANTDS77 =manufacturing 
value added/distribution/value added, 1977. • 
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TABLE 3 
RELATIVE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
ARAB WORLD INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1983 
(standard regression coefficients) 
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MANUF = - 0.38 GET + 0.43 DUTCH + 0.43 DYP + 0.56 MANTDS77 + 0.10 MANN077 
(-3.19) (2.58) (3.16) (1.74) (0.28) 
r2 = 0.868; F = 13.17 df = 15 
MANUF = - 0.47 GEC + 0.36 DUTCH + 0.40 DYP + 0.47 MANTDS77 + 0.10 MANN077 
(-3.79) (2.39) (3.18) (1.59) (1.07) 
r2 = 0.890; F = 16.11 df = 15 
MANUF = - 0.21 MILX + 0.47 DUTCH+ 0.51DYP+0.61 MANTDS77 - 0.16 MANN077 
(-0.95) (1.82) (2.65) (1.30) (-0.28) 
r2 = 0.755; F = 6.19 df = 15 
MANUF= - 0.380IL + 0.54DUTCH + 0.64DYP +0.64MANTDS77-0.17MANN077 
(-2.48) (2.71) (3.81) (1.75) (-0.41) 
r2 = 0.835; F = 10.15 df = 15 
Notes: See notes to Table 2; in this table DUTCH and DYPNO relate to the period 1974-83. 
TABLE 4 
RELATIVE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
~RAB WORLD INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1977 
(standard regression coefficients) 
MANUF = - 0.39 GET + 0.14 DUTCH - 0.21 DYP - 0.38 MANTDS74 + 1.28 MANN074 
(-3.10) (1.19) (-0.84) (-1.41) (4.52) 
r2 = 0.878; F = 14.44 df = 15 
MANUF= - 0.46GEC + 0.14DUTCH- 0.24DYP -0.40MANTDS74 + l.45MANN074 
(-3.42) (1.32) (-2.29) (-1.64) (5.16) 
r2 = 0.897; F = 17.39 df = 15 
MANUF= - 0.17MILX + 0.11DUTCH-0.13DYP-0.16MANTDS74 + 0.90MANN074 
(-1.01) (0. 73) (-0.84) (-0.47) (2.65) 
r2 = 0.783; F = 7.25 df = 15 
MANUF=-: 0.290IL + 0.14DUTCH-0.01DYP-0.29MANTDS74+1.11 MANN074 
(-1.81) (0. 99) (-0.01) (-0.47) (3.36) 
r2 = 0.821; F = 9.16df = 15 
Notes: See notes to Table 2; in this table DUTCH and DYPNO relate to the period 1974-77; 
MANN074 and MANTDS74 relate to 1974. ' 
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In general, the results (Tables 2-4) indicate that: 
1. Dutch disease factors were relatively important in the latter periods in 
affecting the development of the manufacturing. Based on the size of the 
standardized regression coefficients, Dutch disease effects were slightly 
more important than real per capita growth in affecting manufacturing by 
1985. 
2. By 1983, however, real per capita growth had a slightly stronger effect 
on the region's industrial development. 
3. By 1977, however, neither real per capita growth nor the Dutch 
disease effects had made much of an impact on the region's industrial 
development. 
4. In general, higher levels of total government expenditures and 
governmental non-defence expenditures have been associated with 
depressed development of the industrial sector. 
5. This pattern is not simply a spurious correlation, in that it does not 
reflect the fact that high levels of government expenditure are found in 
countries with dominant oil sectors. Except for a weak association in 
1983, development of the oil sector does not appear to be statistically 
significant in explaining the pattern of relative industrial development in 
the Arab world. 
6. In contrast to total governmental expenditures and those for non-
defence activities, military expenditures do not appear to have affected 
Arab world industrial development over the 1974-85 period. While this 
term hact a negative sign in each of the years examined, it was not 
statistically significant in any instance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While it might seem intuitively obvious that shifting public allocations 
from military toward more productive activities would result in a net 
positive stimulus to industrial development, the results presented above 
indicate that there is little evidence that this is the case in the Arab world. 
In fact, other types of governmental expenditure have tended to have a 
relatively strong depressing effect on the region's industrial 
diversification efforts. 
The finding that defence expenditures are rather neutral in regards to 
industrial growth is consistent with other studies with time series analysis 
for individual countries. Apparently allocations to defence can have a net 
negative impact on industrial development; but this is most likely to occur 
only during periods of particularly rapid acceleration in expenditures. 
Perhaps the novel finding of this study was the generally negative 
impact on industrial development prtlduced by non-defence expen-
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ditures. At this point, one can only speculate as to the source of 
these problems. Because Dutch disease and growth effects were 
controlled for, one might suspect crowding-out effects to be the chief 
mechanism through which government expenditures affect industrial 
developmment. It is not at all clear, however, why these should be any 
greater than a similar pre-emption of resources associated with military 
! expenditures. 
In estimating the impact of defence expenditures on the Gulf states, 
Cummings, Askari and Skinner,31 note that labour shortages created by 
;,.,: expanded military expenditures may be a far greater long-term 
impediment to growth in the region than any affects associated with the 
diversion of capital or foreign exchange to military activities. In a 
somewhat similar manner, Mousad32 found that a ten per cent reduction 
in the military spending ratio (per cent of GNP) or a decrease of around 
$12.9 billion would increase education expenditure by around $8.1 billion 
per year. 
The results presented here suggest that additional estimates should be 
made of the impact on economic activity of other types of government 
expenditure - especially those going to administration and services. It 
may well turn out that these expenditures have even higher opportunity 
costs in terms of labour shortages and/or reduced levels of educational 
attainment. 
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